Oversight of EU medical data transfers – an administrative law perspective on cross-border biomedical research administration by Jane Reichel
ORIGINAL PAPER
Oversight of EU medical data transfers – an administrative law
perspective on cross-border biomedical research administration
Jane Reichel1
Received: 16 October 2016 /Accepted: 9 February 2017
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The notion of privacy has long had a central role in
human rights law, not least in connection to health and med-
icine. International, regional and national bodies have enacted
a number of binding and non-binding document for physi-
cians and researchers to adhere to, in order to protect the
autonomy, dignity and privacy of patients and research sub-
jects. With the development of new technologies, the right to
privacy has gained a new perspective; the right to protection of
personal data within information and communication technol-
ogies. The right to data protection has been attributed an in-
creasing importance within EU law. Accordingly, the use of
health data in medical research in general and in biobank-
related medical research in particular, has made data protec-
tion law highly relevant. In medical research involving
biobanks, transferring human biological samples and/or indi-
vidual health data is taking place on a daily basis. These trans-
fers involve several oversight bodies, institutional review
boards (IRBs), research ethics committees, or even data pro-
tection authorities. This article investigates the role of these
national oversight bodies in the transfer of health data in cross-
border research, from an EU law point of view. A special
focus is laid on transfer of health data for research purposes
from the EU to the US, in the light of the recently enacted EU-
US Privacy Shield. Themain question posed is howAmerican
oversight bodies for medical research can be expected to han-
dle the increasingly strict EU requirements for the processing
of health data in medical research review.
Keywords Privacy . Data protection . Data transfer . Medical
research . Ethical review
The notion of privacy has long had a central role in human
rights law, not least in connection to health and medicine [1].
International, regional and national bodies have enacted a
number of binding and non-binding document for physicians
and researchers to adhere to, in order to protect the autonomy,
dignity and privacy of patients, research and data subjects.1
With the development of new technologies, the right to priva-
cy has gained a new perspective; the right to protection of
personal data within information and communication technol-
ogies. Within EU law, the right to data protection has been
attributed an increasing importance. As has been pointed out
by Slokenberga, EU law appears today to identify the general
right of privacy and a right to data protection as two distin-
guishable, but connected rights.2 In the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, privacy is protected under Article 7
and data protection under Article 8.
The use of health data within medical research in general
and in biobank-related medical research in particular, has
made data protection law highly relevant. In medical research
involving biobanks, transferring human biological samples
and/or individual health data is taking place on a daily basis.
Several oversight bodies, institutional review boards (IRBs),
research ethics committees, or even data protection authori-
ties, may be involved in a trans-border situation.
The role of these national oversight bodies in the transfer of
health data in cross-border research is the topic of this article.
The question will be analysed from a EU law point of view,
with the EU Data Protection Law in focus. These oversight
bodies are commonly set up to review and assess the use of
1 See section 1.
2 Slokenberga, [2] Chapter 4.
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health data in medical research, balancing the risks and benefits
raised in research projects.3 Opinions concerning how to bal-
ance the risks and benefits in cross-border sharing of sensitive
data, such as health data, vary among different segments of
society. The international biomedical research community on
one hand is Badvancing a paradigm that embraces the borderless
use and sharing of data^,4 whereas the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) and the EU legislator appear to be
taking a more restrictive approach to data transfers. In the
2015 Schrems-case, the CJEU found that the Commission’s
decision to enter into an agreement with the United States of
America regarding conditions for data transfer, the Safe Harbor-
agreement, was to be annulled since it did not guarantee the
rights of EU data subjects [5]. The recently adopted decision on
the EU-US Data Privacy Shield sets up a rather complex gov-
ernance system to ensure EU data subjects that their EU rights
will also be upheld after any transfer to the US.
The perspective of this article could arguably be seen as
provincial; a localized perspective taking the view of the na-
tional oversight bodies. How can American and other national
oversight bodies reviewing projects involving EU data be ex-
pected to handle EU requirements for the processing of health
data in medical research? How are oversight bodies supposed
to relate towards national constitutional, EU and public inter-
national law, setting the frame for what law is to be applicable
in a cross-border situation? Key notions raised in this discus-
sion are sovereignty, territoriality and jurisdiction.
The EU law on data protection is currently under transfor-
mation – the 1995 Data Protection Directive5 was replaced by
the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation.6 However, the
regulation will not come into force until May 2018, and during
this time the directive is still in effect. The regulation is a sub-
stantial piece of legislation; there are no less than 173 recitals in
the preamble followed by 98 articles. The regulation refers to
the legislator either in the EU or the Member States to further
enact detailed rules in specific areas. The legislative process
underlying the regulation stirred up quite as sum of concerns
in the biobank community, and in other areas of medical and
social research, relying on health data as empirical material.7
The final result is still not entirely clear. With regards to the area
of research, the regulation on nine occasions refers to the pos-
sibility of enacting exceptions from the general data protection
requirements for research purposes,8 and in Article 89, specific
conditions for these exceptions are laid down. Since legislation
with rules governing these exceptions have not yet been
enacted, as of the time of this writing, it is not possible to state
in any detail what requirements EU law will place on the pro-
cessing of personal data in medical research in the future.
However, it is possible to analyse here, the regulation’s general
direction, and to clarify the general conditions in relation to the
question posed: How can national oversight bodies reviewing
projects involving EU data be expected to handle EU require-
ments for the processing of health data in medical research?
The issues relating to international transfers of medical data
are relevant to most medical research, even though the greater
numbers of examples here are found in the area of biobanking.
The reason for this is more a matter of practicality; this author
has been involved in several EU-projects relating to biobanks
in recent years.9
This article is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a
brief overview of the relevant bioethical principles and laws.
The concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and jurisdiction are
introduced in section 2. The responses in EU law towards the
legal challenges posed to cross-border administration are
discussed in section 3. The article concludes with an analysis
of consequences for national oversight bodies, and to whether
national oversight bodies are to become gatekeepers of foreign
rights or rather, as the biomedical community would prefer,
global standards, section 4.
1 Privacy and autonomy in biomedical research –
rules and governance structures at a glance
There are two basic points of departure in legal and bioethical
doctrine in regards to the treatment of human biological sam-
ples required for research, which has reached almost universal
acceptance. First, the use of human biological samples in re-
search is conditional on eligible donors providing informed
consent to such use. Second, that research on human biolog-
ical samples are to be placed under the review of independent
research ethics committees.10 There are scarcely any binding
international conventions at the global level that directly ad-
dress these issues,11 but they can be considered indirectly
3 For the sake of clarity, oversight bodies taskedwith reviewing research ethics
in medical research are here also referred to as research ethics committees. See
further Whitley, [3] p. 39.
4 Dove, Knoppers, and Zawati, [4] p.6.
5 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data.
6 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation).
7 See for example, Abbott, [6].
8 See Articles 5.1 b and e, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of the General Data
Protection Regulation.
9 BBMRI.se, see further BioBankCloud, biobankcloud.com, and most
recently, B3Afica, b3africa.org.
10 Ruffert and Steinecke, [7] pp. 94–96. The content of this section has previ-
ously been discussed in Reichel, [8], p. 172.
11 The UN has enacted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) 1966, which targets medical or scientific experimentation,
but most likely not research on samples of biological material in a biobank,
see the General Comment No. 20 Replaces General Comment 7 concerning
prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7) (Mar. 10,
1992).
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covered by the UN Declaration on Human Rights12 and fur-
ther targeted in several international soft law documents.13 In
Europe, both the Council of Europe14 and the EU have
enacted binding rules. The EU has included explicit rules for
both handling human biological samples, and the handling of
personal data, in the EU Charter, requiring an informed con-
sent from the sample donor/data subject, or, in regards to data,
some other legitimate basis laid down by law.15
To ensure the correct implementation of the principles and
rules associated with medical research, national oversight
bodies, ethical research committees, are called upon to give
an ethical approval for any research project comprising the
handling of human biological samples.16 All of the above-
mentioned guidelines and recommendations require the in-
volvement of research ethics committees in some form.17
Ethical approval is generally needed when setting up a
biobank, collecting samples (and personal data) for a specific
research project, or when re-using old samples already stored
in biobanks [11].
There does not seem to be an equivalent consensus regard-
ing the role of research ethic committees in connection to data
protection in research. Unlike human biological samples, the
transfer of health data is highly regulated even outside medical
research. In EU law, health data belongs to a special category
of data, referred to as sensitive data, where the requirements
for processing are set even higher.18 EU law thus requires that
Member States allow for the processing of health data in re-
search only when ‘suitable safeguards’ or, agreement with the
specified terminology in the General Data Protection
Regulation such as ‘appropriate safeguards’ are in place.19
An appropriate safeguard could however be the involvement
of a research ethics committee, such as for example in
Swedish law.20 In practice, research ethics committees thus
play a very central role in the process of launching medical
research projects, without which the research cannot be
conducted.21
EU data protection law further requires explicit informed
consent for handling of the health data, even if exceptions for
processing for research are available.22 EU data protection law
also gives the data subjects several other rights in connection
to the processing of their personal data, for example a right to
information of how the personal data is being processed, a
right to rectification of the data and right to a judicial remedy
for any breaches of these rights.23 Both the current directive
applied today and the Regulation in effect as of 2018 allow for
certain exceptions from informational rights and the right to
rectification in relation to the processing of health data in
research.24 As discussed further below in section 3, the appli-
cation of data protection law onmedical research is not always
clear and straightforward. This may be especially true for
oversight bodies outside the EU, who, according to the long
12 Article 1 on human dignity could be considered relevant.
13 See for example:
& Council for Int’l Organizations of Med. Sciences & WHO, International
Ethical Guidelines for Epidemiological Studies, guideline 2 (2002);
& Council for Int’l Organizations of Med. Sciences & WHO, International
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects
(2002);
& Declaration of Helsinki Ethical Principles for Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects (2008),
& UN Guidelines concerning computerized data files (1990);
& Council of Europe Recommendation Research on Biological Material of
Human Origin (2006); and
& OECD Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data (2013), [C (80)58/FINAL, as amended on 11
July 2013 by C (2013)79].
There is also ongoing work within several research communities to enact
standards, for example, the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, avail-
able at genomicsandhealth.org/node/12703 and the work within the BBMRI-
ERIC, especially its ELSI common service. See further Rynning, [9] and
Reichel, [8].
14 The Council of Europe has enacted several documents that can be cited in
general terms, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the Social Charter (1961, revised and
expanded in 1996). More specifically, the Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data Council of
Europe (1980) and the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine and its Additional protocol concerning Biomedical Research.
There are also soft law tools, for example Council of Europe
Recommendation No. Rec (2006) 4 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on research on biological materials of human origin.
15 Articles 3.2 and 8.2 of the EU Charter.
16 Ruffert & Steinecke, [7] p. 98.
17 See for example Guidelines 2 and 3 in Council for Int’l Organizations of
Med. Sciences &World Health Org. [WHO], International Ethical Guidelines
for Epidemiological Studies, (2002); Guidelines 2 and 3 in Council for Int’l
Organizations of Med. Sciences & WHO, International Ethical Guidelines for
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 2002, Article 9 in the
Additional protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
Concerning Biomedical Research, (2005), and Article 23 in the WMA
Declaration of Helsinki Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving
Human Subjects, 2008. For an overview of national legal orders in Europe,
see Eleni Zika et al., [10].
18 All processing of the special categories of data is prohibited unless a specific
legal ground is available; Article 9 General Data Protection Regulation and
Article 8 Data Protection Directive.
19 Articles 8 Data Protection Directive and Article 89 in the General Data
Protection Regulation.
20 See for example in Swedish law, section 19 Personuppgiftslag (1998:204)
[Personal Data Act, implementing the EU data Protection Directive], which
refers to lag (2003:460) om etikprövning av. forskning som avser människor
[Act concerning the Ethical Review of Research Involving Humans]. Since the
requirements in the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 will not be
implemented until May 2018, it is still unclear what the condition the ‘appro-
priate safeguards’ will entail at the national level. See further section 3.2.
21 See further [4, 12, 13] and section 5.
22 See Article 8 Data Protection Directive and Article 9 and 89 General Data
Protection Regulation. For a comparison on the right to have an informed
consent for the handling of human biological samples, and the rights included
in European data protection law (including also the Council of Europe), see
also Slokenberga, [2] chapter 8.
23 Articles 10–11, 12 and 22 Data Protection Directive and Articles 11–13,
16–17 (also including a right to be forgotten) and 79 General Data Protection
Regulation.
24 The general requirements for exceptions are laid down in Article 8 Data
Protection Directive and Article 89 in the General Data Protection Regulation.
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reach of EU data protection law could be tasked with uphold-
ing EU data protection rights in their native countries.
2 Sovereignty, territoriality and jurisdiction
A basic feature of the classical (yet contested) understanding
of the concept of state sovereignty, according to Slaughter, is
the right to be left alone, to have a sphere where other states
cannot interfere with the internal affairs of the state.25 She
refers to this notion being included in Article 2 (7) of the
UN Charter; BNothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.^
Classical public international law thereby builds on the pre-
mise that no state can be bound to follow rules to which it has
not consented, i.e., consensual rulemaking.26 Connected to
state sovereignty are the principles of self-determination and
territoriality. These principles entail that it is the task of each
state and their respective administration to handle administra-
tive issues concerning the state, its citizens and activities as
carried out within the state borders.27 Within its territory,
each state has jurisdiction over any legal matters occur-
ring there. The public international law of jurisdiction is
thereby used to ensure that states do not assert jurisdiction
over affairs that are the domain of another state.28 A state
will thus not be bound by legal acts enacted outside that
state, neither administrative decision nor court judgments,
unless it has so agreed through international agreements,
treaties or conventions.29
The understanding of sovereignty, territoriality and ju-
risdiction may differ between different fields of law. The
laws on jurisdiction stem from criminal law and even
though its principles can be applied generally, certain
adaptions may be necessary.30 In the field of administra-
tive law, there traditionally has been a strong connection
between the law and the development of the modern na-
tion state.31 The main task of the administration, as part of
the executive branch, is to implement policies enacted by
its own national legislator.32 It therefore has not been a
very common situation for a national authority to imple-
ment policies from a foreign state, for example, by scru-
tinizing whether bioethical principles and laws are upheld
within a research project.
Through the current processes of globalization and techni-
cal development, not least with respect to the Internet, the
traditional understanding of the concepts of sovereignty, terri-
toriality and jurisdiction have been placed under pressure.
Slaughter has identified two fundamental challenges to the
concept of sovereignty.33 First, the ineffectiveness challenge,
referring to that Ba state’s ability to control its own territory
without external interference is no longer sufficient to allow it
to govern its people effectively – to provide security, econom-
ic stability, and a measure of prosperity, clean air and water
and a minimum of health standards.^34 Second is the interfer-
ence challenge, B[a]ll human rights^, Slaughter maintains,
Bdeliberately infringe on domestic jurisdiction of every state,
denying governments the freedom to torture, murder, ‘disap-
pear’ or systematically discriminate against their own
citizens^.35
The understanding of administrative law as a traditionally
domestic area of law has also undergone changes. Schmidt-
Aßmann has stated that the Binternationalization of adminis-
trative activity can be defined as processes of an administra-
tive nature extending beyond national administrative borders,
either because they have evolved beyond such borders or be-
cause they were, from the outset, conceived without consider-
ation of such borders.^36 In many areas of administrative law,
such as control over pharmaceuticals and medical research,
administrative cooperation beyond the state today takes place
- on a daily basis.37 The legal ground for this cooperation is
normally laid down in international conventions, treaties and
agreements, where the participating states have agreed to
waive some of their sovereign rights in order to be part of a
mutually beneficial cooperation. The EU is an example of this,
a treaty-based international organization, today with consider-
able Bconstitutional^ traits. The administrative cooperation
framework between EU and national authorities has been de-
veloped so far that it may - in certain areas of law and to a
certain extent– be considered a supranational administrative
organization in itself [25].
In connection to those administrative law areas that
are also covered by human rights law, further consider-
ations need to be taken into account. As pointed out by
Slaughter, human rights requirements per se constitute an
intrusion into the sovereignty of the state, in that the
state cannot regulate, nor act in violation to, internation-
ally binding law. Further, regional fundamental law re-
quirements may hinder a state from entering into agree-
ments with other states, not adhering to the same level of
protections within a specific field of law. This is evident-
ly the case with data protection in Europe, where both
25 Slaughter, [14] p. 284
26 Crawford, [15] p. 386.
27 Wenander, [16] p. 49, with further reference to Schwarze, [17].
28 Ryngaert, [18] p. 6.
29 Wenander, [19], p. 762.
30 Compare Ryngaert, [18] p 2. See also Svantesson [20].
31 Loughlin, [21] p. 437.
32 Cassese, [22] p. 605.
33 Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a NetworkedWorld Order, [14] p. 284.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Schmidt-Aßmann, [23] p. 2063.
37 See amongst other volumes [24].
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the Council of Europe and the EU set out requirements
at a level above and beyond the level of protection in
other states.38
3 Administrating EU data transfers in cross-border
research
As stated above, the EU arguably has the strictest data
privacy law in the world, entailing a certain strain on
the transfer of data outside the Union, especially since
the EU has the ambition of upholding data privacy
rights for EU subjects even when the data is processed
overseas. In medical research based on biobanks, both
human biological samples and personal data on health
are used.
Some introductory remarks are given in this section on
the relationship between samples and data in order to
specify what resources are covered by the EU data pro-
tection law (section 3.1). The long reach of EU data pri-
vacy law is then discussed in section 3.2. These rules are
analysed in section 3.3 in a medical research setting.
3.1 Data and samples
The starting point when applying data protection law is
defining data. Can a human biological sample itself be
considered data? Both the Data Protection Directive and
the General Data Protection Regulation define personal
data as Bany information relating to an identified or iden-
tifiable natural person^.39 Neither act defines more closely
what type and form ‘the information relating to an iden-
tified, or identifiable natural person’ is to take. According
to Article 29 of the Data Protection Working Party Group,
human biological samples, such as blood samples, are
themselves sources from which data is extracted, but they
are not data in themselves; Bthe extraction of information
from the samples is collection of personal data, to which
the rules of the Directive apply. The collection, storage
and use of tissue samples themselves may be subject to
separate sets of rules.^40
The preamble to the General Data Protect ion
Regulation states that B[g]enetic data should be defined
as personal data relating to the inherited or acquired ge-
netic characteristics of a natural person which result from
the analysis of a biological sample from the natural person
in question, in particular chromosomal, deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA) analysis, or from
the analysis of another element enabling equivalent infor-
mation to be obtained.41 Once again, the analysis of the
biological sample is considered to be data, but not the
sample itself. The sample is thus not protected under EU
Data Protection Law.
Consequently, EU data protection law is highly rele-
vant to medical research: the result from a DNA analysis
will always be considered personal data, even without any
accompanying information such as the name of the patient
or a code to which only trusted third parties have the key.
The DNA in itself is an identifier. However – even if EU
data protection law is highly relevant, it is not alone. As
pointed out by the Article 20 of the Data Protection
Working Party Group, the handling of human biological
samples may be subject to other sets of rules.
3.2 The long reach of EU data protection law –
extraterritorial scope and strict requirements
for transferring data
All states by definition are, at least as a point of depar-
ture, sovereign and thereby independent of each other.
One feature of sovereignty is the capacity to decide on
legal matters occurring within the borders of that state.
Legal conventions on jurisdiction have been seriously
challenged by the types and forms of data usage within
the Internet.42
Within its data protection law, the EU has taken as a
general standpoint that the rights of EU data subjects
should be protected regardless of where the data is proc-
essed. The EU has thus established two different paths to
ensuring that EU data subjects’ rights to data protection
are not undermined by free-flowing information routes on
the Internet. First, the scope of application of the EU data
protection law is very wide and could even be described
as extraterritorial (section 3.2.1). Secondly, EU data pro-
tection law sets up far reaching requirements on the re-
cipient of EU data in order for a transfer of data outside
the scope of application of EU data protection law to be
considered legal (section 3.2.2). These rules have espe-
cially stirred some controversy in relation to the US, as
analysed in section 3.2.3.
38 Svantesson holds that the EU has the most influential and arguably strictest
data privacy laws in the world. Svantesson, [26] p. 55. See also Slokenberga,
[2] chapter 9.
39 Article 2 of the Data Protection Directive and Article 4 of the General Data
Protection Regulation.
40 Article 29 of the Data Protection Working Party Group, Opinion 4/2007 on
the concept of personal data, 01248/07/EN WP 136. In regards to rules appli-
cable to collection, storage and use of tissue samples, the Working Party refers
to Council of Europe Recommendation No. (2006)4 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on research on biological materials of human
origin.
41 Recital 34 in the preamble of the General Data Protection Regulation.
42 Svantesson, [26], p. 55
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3.2.1 The territorial scope of application of EU data
protection rules
The Data Protection Directive already had an unusually broad
definition of territorial scope,43 and the General Data
Protection Regulation expands it a bit further. Article 3.1–2
of the Regulation states:
1. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal
data in the context of those activities of an establish-
ment of a controller or a processor in the Union, re-
gardless of whether the processing takes place in the
Union or not.
2. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data
of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or
processor not established in the Union, where the process-
ing activities are related to:
(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of
whether a payment of the data subject is required,
to such data subjects in the Union; or
(b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their be-
haviour takes place within the Union.
According to the first paragraph, all situations where a per-
son who is established in the EU processes personal data,
either on one’s own behalf (controller) or on behalf of another
(processor),44 must follow the rules in the regulation. Whether
the data is actually processed, for example, in a cloud service,
is irrelevant. This means, for example, that if a medical re-
searcher responsible for processing personal data in Japan (a
controller, in EU terms) uses a data storage service established
in the EU, (a processor established in the EU), the Japanese
controller must adhere to EU law in regards to the data stored
with the European service provider.
The second paragraph defines certain situations in which it
is the EU data subject him or herself that renders the regulation
applicable, even when the controller and processor is
established outside the EU. This is the case where the control-
ler or processor targets the EU data subject, either by offering
goods or services, or by monitoring their behaviour, if the
behaviour takes place within the EU. There are countless pro-
viders of services and goods all over the world who may fall
under this category, requiring them to uphold EU data protec-
tion law.45
3.2.2 The requirements for transferring data to third countries
Both the Data Protection Directive and the General Data
Protection Regulation contain rules setting out the require-
ments and conditions for the transfer of personal data outside
the EU. Content-wise, the differences between the directive
and regulation are not significant, however, the Brules^ within
the regulation are more detailed.
Article 44 of the General Data Protection Regulation sets
out the general principles for allowing transfers to third coun-
tries, including any onward transfer:
Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing pro-
cessing or are intended for processing after transfer to a
third country or to an international organisation shall
take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this
Regulation, the conditions laid down in this Chapter are
complied with by the controller and processor, including
for onward transfers of personal data from the third
country or an international organisation to another third
country or to another international organisation.
All transfers outside the EUmust first comply – as always -
with the principles in the regulation, meaning that there has to
be a legal basis for the processing of the personal data that
includes a transfer outside the EU.46 In regards to special
categories of data, such as health data, there must further be
a specific legal ground for processing.47 Secondly, there has to
bemechanisms in place to ensure that the rights of the EU data
subjects will also be upheld when the data is transferred out-
side the EU.
The regulation provides a number of set procedures that
can be divided into three main categories. These can be seen
as hierarchical, with the first category offering the most
43 Article 4 of the Data Protection Directive containing the equivalent rule on
territorial scope, is drafted somewhat differently since EU directives (but reg-
ulations) are to be implemented into national law. That article states: 1. Each
Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this
Directive to the processing of personal data where:
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an estab-
lishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the same
controller is established on the territory of severalMember States, he must take
the necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies
with the obligations laid down by the national law applicable;
(b) the controller is not established on the Member State^s territory, but in a
place where its national law applies by virtue of international public law;
(c) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes
of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise,
situated on the territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is
used only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community.
2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 (c), the controller must
designate a representative established in the territory of that Member State,
without prejudice to legal actions which could be initiated against the control-
ler himself.
44 For definitions of the terms Bcontroller^ and Bprocessor^, see Article 4 (7)
and (8) in the General Data Protection Regulation.
45 See for a critical analysis, Svantesson, [26] p. 71.
46 Article 6.1(a) General Data Protection Regulation, corresponding to Article
7 Data Protection Directive. See also section 1 above.
47 Article 9 General Data Protection Regulation, corresponding to Article 8
Data Protection Directive. In regards to research, the regulation requires that
appropriate safeguards are in place, which usually can consist of a review by a
research ethics committee.
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efficient and thorough protection. First, transfer may take
place if the Commission has enacted an adequacy decision,
meaning that the Commission has found that Ba country, a
territory or one ormore specified sectors within that country…
ensures an adequate level of protection^ (Article 45).48
Protection in this context refers to legal protection, the exis-
tence of a legal framework for data protection, together with
sufficient enforcement mechanisms. A Safe Harbor
Agreement, further discussed in section 3.2.3, is an example
of this [27]. Secondly, in the absence of such decision, data
may be transferred if appropriate safeguards are available, on
the condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective
legal remedies for data subjects are available (Article 46).49
These safeguards, for example, may be legally binding and
enforceable instruments between public authorities, binding
corporate rules (later further regulated in Article 47), standard
data protection clauses adopted by the Commission, or on the
basis of especially approved codes of conduct. Contractual
clauses between the sender and recipient, subject to the autho-
rization of a competent supervisory authority, also fall within
this category. Thirdly, in the absence of either an adequacy
decision or appropriate safeguards, there is a list of
derogations in Article 49.50
There are two categories of derogations; Article
49.1(1)(a)-(g) lists seven specific situational derogations.
One is the existence of an explicit informed consent from
the data subject where he or she has been informed of the
possible risk of transfer. Others are where the transfer is nec-
essary due to a contract involving the data subject, an impor-
tant reason of public interest or in connection to a legal claim.
Article 49.1(2) contains the second category of derogations,
which is open, but can only be used under rather limited
circumstances:
[O]nly if the transfer is not repetitive, concerns only a
limited number of data subjects, is necessary for the
purposes of compelling legitimate interests pursued by
the controller which are not overridden by the interests
or rights and freedoms of the data subject, and the con-
troller has assessed all the circumstances surrounding
the data transfer and has on the basis of that assessment
provided suitable safeguards with regard to the protec-
tion of personal data.
The controller must further then inform the competent su-
pervisory authority, as well as the data subjects concerned.
A fourth and final procedure is mentioned only briefly
here; the transfer of judgments and official decisions, requir-
ing a controller or processor to disclose personal data, is per-
mitted if based on an international agreement, such as a mu-
tual legal assistance treaty (Article 48). If none of the
abovementioned grounds are available, the transfer of EU data
outside the Union is not allowed.
3.2.3 The Safe Harbor-agreement, Schrems and the EU/US
privacy shield
The Safe Harbor-agreement between the EU and US is an
example of an adequacy decision, enacted under Article
25.6 of the Data Protection Directive, the predecessor of
Article 45 in the General Data Protection Regulation.51 The
agreement itself was annexed to an actual decision enacted by
the Commission, ensuring that entities within the US adhered
to the principles laid down in the agreement. Thereby the
entities could be considered trustworthy recipients of EU data.
EU controllers could transfer personal data to these entities
without further ado. As stated above, the Court of Justice in
Schrems found that the Commission’s decision was invalid,
since the Safe Harbor agreement did not sufficiently ensure an
adequate level of protection for EU data rights.52
The Schrems-case was brought by an Austrian law student,
Maximilian Schrems. He argued that his personal data on his
Facebook account was not properly protected, a fact made
apparent following the revelations made by Edward
Snowden concerning the activities of the US intelligence ser-
vices.53 The Court held that while the term Badequate level of
protection^ in Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC does not
mean a level of protection identical to that guaranteed in the
EU legal order, it must be understood as requiring a third
country to ensure a level of protection of fundamental rights
and freedoms Bessentially equivalent^ to that guaranteedwith-
in the Union by virtue of the Data Protection Directive, read in
light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.54
The main criticism of the Court focused on the obligation
for entities within the US to disregard the Safe Harbor-princi-
ples, in the event Bnational security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements^ within the US legal system so
required.55 As the Court rather laconically stated, since US
legislation permitted public authorities such as the NSA Bto
have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic
communications^, this constituted a breach of the EU right to
privacy as guaranteed byArticle 7 of the Charter.56 There is no
48 Corresponding to Article 25 in the Data Protection Directive.
49 Previously regulated in Article 26.2 in the Data Protection Directive, how-
ever the requirement to ensure that the rights of the data subject are enforceable
was not explicitly mentioned. See further section 3.3.
50 Corresponding to Article 26.1 Data Protection Directive.
51 Safe Harbor Decision, [27].
52 C-362/14 Schrems, [5].
53 Ibid., para. 28.
54 Ibid., para. 73.
55 Ibid., paras. 85–86, referring to Safe Harbor Decision, Part B of
Annex IV, [27].
56 Ibid., para. 94.
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legal basis in EU data protection law that would render such
indiscriminate surveillance of personal data lawful. Further,
the fact that the US legal system did not provide for any
effective remedy for EU data subjects was contrary to
Article 47 of the EU Charter and the right to effective judicial
protection.57
The legal protection sought after by the CJEU did thus not
find its match within the political reality that the Commission
had tried to master over the years of negotiations with its
American counterpart. The Schrems –case was not the first
time criticism towards the US was heard from the EU.
Negotiation between the Commission and the US on different
aspects of data protection had been going on already since
2010,58 and were intensified after the verdict of the Court
was delivered in 2015. A political agreement between the
EU and US was reached in early in 2016,59 and the
Commission presented a communication to the EU legislators
at the end of February, explaining the agreement in detail.60 A
new adequacy decision, the EU-US Privacy Shield, was
enacted in July 2016.61
The EU-US Privacy Shield is drafted as a general de-
cision on the transfer of data, but is mainly directed to
commercial activities and businesses. The Privacy
Principles comprise thirteen Framework Principles similar
to those in the Safe Harbor-agreement. Further there are
Supplemental Principles, including specifications and ex-
ceptions to the framework principles as well as informa-
tional and institutional rules for the American data con-
trollers to follow. The principles are found in Annex II to
the draft decision.62
That more interesting for the issue raised here is the gover-
nance structure of the agreement and the requirements to guar-
antee recourse mechanisms for EU data subjects. The EU-US
Privacy shield is built on a system of self-certification by
which US organizations commit to the Privacy Principle.63
The US Department of Commerce maintains, it is to maintain
a list of all participating US organizations that have committed
to the principles. In order to remain on the list, organizations
will have to re-certify annually.64
Further, under the Recourse, Enforcement and Liability
Principle, all participating listed organizations must provide
Brobust mechanisms to ensure compliance with the other
Principles and recourse for EU data subjects whose personal
data have been processed in a noncompliant manner, includ-
ing effective remedies^.65 Organizationsmay choose indepen-
dent recourse mechanisms in either the EU or US. This in-
cludes the possibility to voluntarily commit to cooperating
with the European data protection authorities. If handling hu-
man resources data collected in the context of an employment
relationship, cooperation with EU authorities is mandatory.66
This also affects the choice of applicable law, since EU law
will be relevant for interpretation of the compliance of US
organization67:
U.S. law will apply to questions of interpretation and
compliance with the Principles and relevant privacy pol-
icies by Privacy Shield organizations, except where
such organizations have committed to cooperate with
European data protection authorities.
European data protection authorities are to establish a spe-
cific pan-EU panel to resolve these complaints.68 When US
organizations are cooperating with EU data protection author-
ities, the US actors will accordingly have to abide by the EU
interpretation of the Privacy Shield and its principles and will
further be bound by the decisions of a pan-EU panel.69
3.3 Applying EU data protection rules on transfer
of health data in medical research
How can these requirements concerning the transfer of EU
data be applied in the context of biomedical research? As set
out above, a transfer of a human biological sample includes
privacy issues both regarding the sample itself and regarding
the personal data retrievable from the sample. These two is-
sues are dealt with separately, at least within the EU.
Regarding the transfer of the biological material itself, there
57 Ibid., para. 95.
58 MEMO 10/1661 of the European Commission, published on 3 December
2010, available at:
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1661_en.htm; MEMO 11/203 of the
European Commission, published on 29 March 2011, available at: europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-203_en.htm and Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Rebuilding Trust in
EU U.S. Data Flows, COM(2013) 846 final and Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning
of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies
established in the EU, COM(2013) 847 final.
59 See press release from the Commission; europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-216_en.htm?locale = en.
60 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring Trust through Strong
Safeguards, COM (2016) 117 final.
61 Commission implementing decision of 12.7.2016 pursuant to Directive 95/
46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the
protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, C (2016) 4176 final (EU/
US Privacy Shield Decision).
62 Ibid., note 64, Annex II. The Principles are: Notice, Choice, Accountability
for Onward Transfer, Security, Data Integrity and Purpose Limitation, Access
and Recourse and Enforcement and Liability.
63 Ibid., recital 31 and Annex I and Annex II (Sec. I.3, Sec. I.4, III.6.d, and
Sec. III.11.g)
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., Recital 26 and supplemental principle BDispute Resolution and
Enforcement^, Annex II, Sec. III.11.
66 Ibid. Annex 2, Supplementary Principles, III.1.5.
67 Ibid. Annex 2, Overview, I.7.
68 Ibid., Annex 2, Supplementary Principles, III 1.5.c.
69 Ibid., Annex 2, Supplementary Principles, III 1.5.c. ii.
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are no globally applicable administrative rules (section 1).
According to established medical research practices, a transfer
of human biological material is to be preceded by entering into
an agreement between the sender and recipient, a Material
Transfer Agreement (MTA).70 All the conditions for handling
the samples are regulated in the MTA, such as specific restric-
tions regarding the given consent, etc.71
Transfer of data within medical research from the EU must
fall within one of the mechanisms set out above (section
3.2.2.) Even before the Schrems-judgment, the Safe Harbor
principles were not commonly used when transferring health
data to medical researchers in the US, since the principles are
directed towards commercial activities and not research.
Instead, an appropriate safeguard mechanism was applied,
contractual clauses having been authorized by a competent
supervisory authority, i.e. a research ethics committee.72
These contracts are referred to as Data Transfer Agreements
(DTA), regulating the obligations of both the sender and re-
cipient of the data.73 It should however be underlined that the
requirements laid down in Safe Harbor, the Schrems-case and
now EU-US Privacy Shield are still relevant for medical re-
search, since they can be used as benchmark as to what level
of protection should be ensured EU data subjects.
As stated above, applying an appropriate safeguard in the
General Data Regulation is conditioned on the availability of
Benforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies
for data subjects^.74 This condition is not explicitly laid down
in the Data Protection Directive. Neither does the directive
explicitly require this in reference to the assessment for an
adequacy decision.75 The Court placed considerable weight
on these issues in Schrems76:
Even though the means to which that third country has
recourse, in this connection, for the purpose of ensuring
such a level of protection may differ from those
employed within the European Union in order to ensure
that the requirements stemming from Directive 95/46
(Data Protection Directive] read in the light of the
Charter are complied with, those means must neverthe-
less prove, in practice, effective in order to ensure pro-
tection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within
the European Union.
Since the US legal system could not ensure this pro-
tection, it was not considered safe. As pointed out by
Hofmann, this is the first time the Court has declared an
EU act illegal due to breaches of fundamental rights with-
out performing a balancing test to assess whether the lim-
itation of the fundamental right could be seen as legiti-
mate in a democratic society.77 The breach of the right of
private life and to an effective judicial review was conse-
quently so far-reaching that it was seen as violating the
Bessence both of the right to privacy and the protection of
personal data as it arises from Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter as well as the essence of the right to an effective
judicial remedy under Article 47 Charter .^78
It remains to be seen how the more detailed rules for pro-
cessing of health data in research will be regulated in the EU
Member States. Arguably, the focus on the rights of the data
subject may entail a shift concerning the expected mandate of
the research ethics committees and other oversight bodies for
research, if they are to uphold the Data Protection Regulation.
As of today, the specific rights of the data subject, amongst
others involving such matters as the right to redress, is not
usually addressed in either MTAs nor DTAs entered into by
sending and receiving research institutions. These agreements
often include how to handle legal conflicts between the send-
ing and receiving research institutions, for example issues
relating to intellectual property, but the sample donor/data
subject is usually absent.79 The research ethics committees
within the EUwhich are approving DTAs for transfers to third
countries should thus ensure that there are effective remedies
available for the data subject within the receiving institution.
Accordingly, research ethics committees in states outside the
EU could be asked to review and ensure the rights of EU data
subjects in order to allow for research cooperation. The re-
quirements within EU law create new tasks to be handled
within the governance structure for applicable bioethical as-
pects. Whether this is good is discussed in the following and
final section.
70 See for example, Mascalzoni, et al., [11] p. 721 and INT’L SOC’Y FOR
BIOLOGICAL & ENVTL. REPOSITORIES, 2012 BEST PRACTICES FOR
REPOSITORIES: COLLECTION, STORAGE, RETRIEVAL, AND DISTRIBUTION OF
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS FOR RESEARCH 147 (3d ed. 2011), available at isber.
org/bp/documents/ISBERBestPractices3rdedition.pdf.
71 Mascalzoni, et al., [11] p. 724.
72 Article 26.2 Data Protection Directive and Article 46.3.a General Data
Protection Regulation.
73 See for example, Mascalzoni, et al., [11] pp. 722, 724.
74 Article 46(1) General Data Protection Regulation.
75 According to Article 25(2) Data Protection Directive, the assessment is to
be based on the following:
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be
assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer oper-
ation or set of data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given
to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing
operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination,
the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in
question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied
with in that country.
76 C-362/14 Schrems, [5], para. 74.
77 In accordance with Article 52(1) in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
and Hofmann, [28].
78 Ibid. p. 2 and C-362/14 Schrems, [5] paras. 94 and 95.
79 See Mascalzoni, et al., [11] pp. 726–727, where a draft MTA/DTA is
provided.
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4 Research ethics committees as gatekeepers
of foreign rights or global standards – what
about the localized administrative law perspective?
Returning now to the localized administrative law perspective
perspective of research oversight; what should be expected of
national research ethics committees? As seen above, the core
task for these committees is to assess research proposals from
the point of view of a risk-benefit analysis; do the benefits of
the proposed research outweigh the potential risks for research
subjects or others? This task is not conducted in a vacuum; the
research committee is embedded in constitutional, societal and
cultural contexts. These contexts in turn are connected to no-
tions such as sovereignty, territoriality and jurisdiction, as
such can be understood in a globalized world. The notions
are not the same as they used to be, but they are not yet
obsolete. States and regional international organizations such
as the EU still have an interest in ensuring that the legal rights
enacted to protect their citizens (and others) can be effectively
implemented. The issue at stake here is that with globali-
zation and the internet, states and international actors are
no longer able to single-handedly command and control
the arena in which rights are to be upheld. This is espe-
cially true with the rights to data protection.
Even within the globalized area of cross-border medical
research, states and regional international organizations are
thus relevant. The underlying values and ideas of the bioeth-
ical aspects of law can to a large extent be described as uni-
versal, but there are still national and regional differences, not
the least when it comes to data protection. In the Helsinki
Declaration, the connection between the research ethics com-
mittee and the law of the land is underscored but not given
exclusive importance80:
It [the research ethics committee] must take into consid-
eration the laws and regulations of the country or coun-
tries in which the research is to be performed as well as
applicable international norms and standards but these
must not be allowed to reduce or eliminate any of the
protections for research subjects set forth in this
Declaration.
The law of the land is to be applied, together with relevant
international norms and standards, as long as these do not
undermine the Helsinki Declaration itself. The question here
is what happens if the connections to the constitutional, soci-
etal and cultural contexts are altogether detached, as in the
situation where a research ethics committee is to uphold the
rights enacted by a legislator in another part of the world.
According to EU data protection law, a transfer of data is
conditioned on the fact that the receiving institutions can
guarantee the data subject that his/her rights according to
EU law will be protected to an acceptable degree.81 EU
data rights are to be respected regardless of where the data
is processed in the world.
There is an obvious risk of an Bover-bureaucratization^ of
data protection when oversight bodies are to uphold the rules
of a legislator different than the one appointed by the consti-
tutional context in which they are embedded. Ensuring that
authorities implement the rules of their own legislator in a
correct and efficient manner can be challenging in itself, and
to achieve the efficient implementation of rules enacted by a
different legislator may need extra attention [29]. In order to
verify that the data will actually be protected after a transfer,
the EU /US privacy law, for example, has introduced a rather
complex scheme of annual self-evaluations for companies,
requirements of information, together with mechanisms of
redress for data subjects. The system further is to be under
the supervision of either EU and US authorities, where the
allocation of the final say in interpretation of the rules
may vary.82 However, even if the system is complex, it
does not necessarily mean it is effective. It remains to be
seen if the CJEU will find that the EU-US Privacy Shield
affords an adequate level of protection, if and when the
question will be placed before the Court.
The foreign oversight bodies tasked with supervising the
processing of EU data within their jurisdiction, research ethics
committees as the case may be, will be in a situation where
data from individuals from the EU is to be treated differently
from other individual’s data. The idea has a certain distasteful
European ethno-centric ring to it. Alsowithin the EU, the rules
on transfer may to risk lead to different treatments based on
the origin of the data. When importing foreign data into the
EU, the equivalent protection is to be upheld vis-à-vis data
subjects in third countries. However, this question has not
rendered much interest from EU policy-makers or academics.
What are the mechanisms in place within the EU to ensure that
data subjects in third countries have consented to the use of
their data, on equal terms as data subjects within the EU? How
can their rights to information and access to effective judicial
review be upheld? EU law does not provide any convincing
answer to these queries.
The question boils down to if there is a better way. The
introduction above referred to a debate within the bioethical
research community, Badvancing a paradigm that embraces
the borderless use and sharing of data^.83 Those authors drew
on the work done within the Global Alliance for Genomics
and Health.84 The Global Alliance, founded in 2013, connects
80 Article 23.1 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects.
81 Supra, sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
82 See above, section 3.2.3.
83 Dove, Knoppers, & Zawati, [4] p.6.
84 Information on the Global Alliance can beo found on its webpage,
http://genomicsandhealth.org/.
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organizations in health care, research and secure disease ad-
vocacy, having as its mission to Baccelerate progress in human
health by helping to establish a common framework of har-
monized approaches to enable effective and responsible shar-
ing of genomic and clinical data, and by catalyzing data shar-
ing projects that drive and demonstrate the value of data
sharing.^85 In a similar vein, Dove has also argued the follow-
ing in relation to biobanks86:
Most critically, data sharing must occur in an environ-
ment whereby the privacy interests of research partici-
pants are safeguarded throughout the lifecycle of a
biobank initiative, and regardless of the location where
the data are processed. Such safeguards can best be in-
stituted where there is a global governance framework
that provides substantially universally acceptable assur-
ance that reasonable expectations of privacy will be met,
and mutual recognition of the privacy norms in relation
to the contemplated uses of data (and biospecimens).
The follow-up question is how to define Breasonable
expectations of privacy^ at the global level. The doctrine
itself emanates from US constitutional law, where it is
used as a test to define the scope of application of priva-
cy protection of the Fourth Amendment to the US
Federal Constitution [32]. It is quite clear at least that
the EU and US have different views on data protection,
judging from the Schrems-case, the EU-US Privacy
Shield and the detailed rules on data transfer in the newly
enacted General Data Protection Regulation. It is far from
self-evident that data subject in the US and the rest of the
world have the same expectations. Instead, a lack of trust
and understanding of the others’ views on data protection
seem to be a significant part of the problem.87
So, even if the idea of a global standard in itself
sounds persuasive, it is difficult to see how it could be
implemented in practice. The research ethics committees
remain in a difficult situation. In this connection Kaye
has maintained88:
The authority of these bodies are national, yet in the
context of the increasingly global research, such
bodies adjudicate on complex issues associated with
international data sharing and privacy. National
bodies do not always have the authority, scope or
expertise to assess the privacy risks associated with
global data sharing or to ensure compliance with
their decisions.
The task is not easy, even without any consideration
of the EU data protection requirements placed on non-
EU oversight bodies. Yet, research ethics committees
have become essential building blocks in order to
achieve legitimacy and trustworthiness in medical re-
search.89 Their role and function ought to be facilitated,
not overburdened.
The most workable way forward may be, as often is the
case, the middle way. Standard setting and self-regulation for a
long time has been an important component in the governance
of biomedical research [36]. A soft bottom-up approach to
standard-setting and best practices within the research com-
munity in combination with national oversight bodies collab-
orating in mutual respect for each-others mandate and juris-
diction is more plausible. Over a longer perspective, the EU
should work together with its partners in global research to
facilitate the work of research ethics committees, within the
EU and elsewhere, wherever EU data is processed.90 Until a
common understanding can be reached, and such may take a
considerable amount of time, the research community would
do best by providing their expertise through persuasive au-
thority in dialogues with policy-makers around the globe.
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